things and processes comprise an aspect of activity which is of the same nature as vital and psychical activity; and it is only by the neglect, the overlooking, of this aspect that physical science has arrived at its mechanistic account of the physical world. The most obvious illustration of the abstractness of this account is the way in which matter and energy are commonly spoken of as realities of two distinct kinds.

Haldane distinguishes various levels of interpretation. The lowest and most abstract is the mathematical; rather less abstract, the physical; next, the biological sciences which abstract from the psychical activities of organisms ; then psychology, still abstract because it treats individual organisms as isolated entities; finally, the least abstract or most concrete, the philosophical or religious account of the universe, which attempts to be all-inclusive. Or, as Haldane himself puts it, in the inverse order, we might have begun with religion, and £ have passed in succession to psychology, biology, physical science, and mathematics. These sciences would thus re-present successive stages in which our experience is stripped more and more of its actual content by a process of artificial abstraction. . . . All these sciences neglect elements in our experience, mathematical interpretation most, and psychological interpretation least. . . . This world is a concrete spiritual world. The conception of it as a physical world is an abstraction of great practical use for certain limited practical purposes, but not more than a very partial representation of

experience. . . . The world of our experience becomes now a psychological or concrete spiritual world of personalities.' Hence: [4] Biological interpretation covers the whole of our perceived universe in so far as we leave conscious behaviour out of account.

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